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Abstract
Linhares and Freitas (2010; LF) argue that experts use analogical or semantic similarity, similarities 
that are not available from direct surface representations.  LF make their case using a critique 
of Chase and Simon (1973b) and the presentation of a few chess positions and examples from 
other domains.  Their conclusion is that models such as CHREST (Gobet et al., 2001) and 
theories such as the chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973b) and the template theory (Gobet 
& Simon, 1996) are inadequate for dealing with these issues.  They propose an alternative 
paradigm, which they call “experience recognition.”  Although we find this issue an interesting 
one, the separation between pattern recognition and problem solving is a lot more complex than 
LF portray.  We instead suggest that a “revolution” in our to date successful modelling is not 
necessary.  Especially in the chess domain, LF’s examples do not make the point they claim. 
Furthermore, their criticisms of CS are incorrect, and they have failed to mention a large 
number of experimental results that have supported the hypothesis of location-specific 
encodings. Although we agree that experts use semantic information and similarities, these 
ideas already possess analogues in CHREST, which can form the basis of further evolution of 
the theory.
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Perception in Chess and Beyond: Commentary on Linhares and Freitas (2010)
Ever since the seminal work of De Groot (1978/1946) on chess, the link between perception 
and abstraction has been a central question in psychology. First, there is the question of what is at 
the heart of (expert) cognition: perception based on surface similarity vs. perception based on 
analogy. Second, there is the question of whether perception relies on a large number of long-term 
memory structures acquired over a long period of time (typically more than 10 years with experts), 
as proposed by chunk-based theories (Chase & Simon, 1973b; Gobet & Simon, 1996b), or whether 
perception relies on the rapid creation of new chunks, for example using a small number of 
combinations of fluid abstract roles, as proposed by Linhares (2005) and Linhares and Brum 
(2007).
Linhares and Freitas (2010; hereafter LF) analyse the classic paper by Chase and Simon 
(1973b; hereafter CS) and later modelling work using CHREST (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet et 
al., 2001; Gobet & Waters, 2003) and CHUMP (Gobet & Jansen, 1994), and discuss research on the 
hypothesis that analogy lies at the core of cognition. They conclude that undue attention has been 
given to the idea of pattern recognition, and that the field should instead focus on “experience 
recognition.” More specifically, they argue that Chase and Simon’s analysis of chunks is flawed, 
and that chunking theory, CHREST and CHUMP and other theories based on pattern recognition 
are invalid because they focus on surface information (the assumption of location coding) and do 
not consider abstract and semantic features. In this commentary, we show that LF’s criticisms are 
deeply flawed.  
The Assumption of Location Coding
We begin with what LF see as “perhaps the most profound problem” (p. 69) with CHREST 
and related models: their lack of flexibility, and in particular their assumption that knowledge is 
stored with information about the specific location. When making their case, LF often use 
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illustrative chess positions and ask the reader to rely on their intuitions. With respect to the issue of 
location coding, they invite the reader to imagine that all pieces in their position 10 (reproduced 
here in Figure 1a) are shifted horizontally or vertically (or both). Then, they write, (LF, p. 69): “But 
is this shifted position actually different from the original in any significant sense? No: experts have 
reported to us that this shifting of position 10 ‘means nothing, it’s the very same position’ (Linhares 
& Brum, 2007). …. Every piece may have moved, but in essence, the position is the same – and so 
is the strategy for play.” One of us is an international chess master and, like any master worth their 
salt, cringes when reading this. Consider the positions (b) and (c) in Figure 1. In position (b), the 
pieces have been shifted down and to the left; the black King is stalemated (no legal move is 
possible for Black), and the outcome of the game is a draw rather than a win as in position (a).  In 
position (c), the pieces have been shifted down and to the right (except for the white King, which 
cannot be shifted to the right as it would be outside of the bounds of the board). Actually, the 
position of the white King is critical. If it is located on h8 or h7, the position is won for White. If it 
is located anywhere else the position is a draw, because Black keeps his King on e7 and f8, and the 
only plan for winning is to bring the King to the squares d8, d7, or d6 (there is no path to h8 or h7), 
at which point the black King is stalemate.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Insert Figure 2 about here
The reader might object that, in this case, LF’s statement holds in most shiftings of the 
pieces. This is true, but consider now their position 20, reproduced here as Figure 2a. The key 
pattern here is (kb8, rc8, pa7, pb7, Nc7, Qf4), and the solution is 1.Na6 double-check ka8 2.Qb8 
check rxb8 3.Nc7 checkmate. Now shift this pattern anywhere on the board, for example as in 
Figure 2b, and there is no checkmate. (If you allow for mirror-image symmetry and change of 
colour, this combination is possible only in the other three corners of the board.)  This combination 
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relies on the mobility of the black King being limited by the side of the board: there is no ninth row 
and zeroth column. Indeed, position 2b is winning for Black while position 2a was winning for 
White.
 The assumption of location encoding has been challenged before LF by Holding (1985), 
who suggested that the number of chunks proposed by Chase and Simon was exaggerated, and 
could be reduced by using symmetries on the board. This suggestion has not been supported by 
experiments. Saariluoma (1994) showed that swapping quadrants of positions impaired recall 
within the swapped quadrants; Gobet and Simon (1996a) showed that mirror images impaired 
recall; and Didierjean, Cauzinille-Marmèche and Savina (1999) found that players could not 
generalise the smothered checkmate pattern (as in Figure 2a) to its mirror image. 
In the examples above, shifting the complete chess position leads to radical changes in its 
evaluation.  This is because, with a complete position, the edges of the board play a significant role. 
In contrast, problem solving in the small may require a different treatment: for example, learning 
that a white pawn on d4 may take a black knight on e5 could be generalised to a position with a 
white pawn on e4 and a black knight on f5.  We agree that in local problem solving cases such as 
this, the location-encoding representation removes the possibility of a natural generalisation.  
The distinction between global and local problem solving means that LF’s objections do not 
identify any flaw in the CHREST architecture, for several reasons.  First, the discrimination 
network within CHREST is not the complete repository of the model’s chess knowledge. The eye 
heuristics also rely on domain expertise, and suggest fixations based on local information, such as 
attacking/defending moves and natural groupings or salient pieces.  Second, CHREST to date has 
not been intended as a model of chess playing but only of chess perception and memory.  The focus 
on chess memory, especially of expert players, has led us to develop a model capable of dealing 
with the complete chessboard.  Small refinements to the internal representations can be used to 
provide a bridge between local relations and global location-encodings; this bridge would enable 
some local generalisations to be made fairly easily, but this is not the place to discuss alternative 
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representations.  
Corrections of Critique of CS
LF state their view of CS very clearly (p. 72, italics in original): “[LF] is not making a minor 
claim about some obscure technical error: all the results in the 20 pages following page 61 are 
claimed to be invalid.” These 20 pages consist of the presentation of a methodology for identifying 
chunks using both a copy and a recall task, and the presentation and analysis of the results they 
obtained.1 LF’s key claim is that, in CS, “performance on the tasks is indistinguishable between a 
master and a beginner” (p. 72).  LF’s argument is thus that there is no difference at all in 
performance between the master and the beginner with respect to all analyses related to chunking. 
However, a cursory look at CS shows that this claim is plainly wrong.
Latencies. With respect to the analysis of within and between glance latencies, LF write that 
“The results were unequivocal: the data was exactly the same for masters and beginners (see figs. 3 
and 4 of that paper). They pointed this out clearly: [Perception task, p. 65] ‘The first thing to notice 
is that the data are quite similar for all subjects. …’”  (LF, p. 71, italics in original). 
This claim is simply incorrect. On p. 62, CS explicitly discuss the skill difference for the 
perception task (lower part of their Figure 3): “For the between-glance intervals, there was a 
tendency for the better players to take less time: the mean latencies were 2.8, 3.2, and 3.5 sec for M, 
A, and B, respectively. The differences between these means are statically [sic] significant (p < .05) 
when tested against a pooled error term.” The passage that LF quote (starting with “The first thing 
to notice…”) from CS is literally out of context: the passage refers to the discussion of Tables 1 and 
2 (which deal with the probabilities and latencies as a function of the patterns of relations – attack, 
defense, etc.), and not, as implied by LF, to Figures 3 and 4.
Contents of chunks. As made clear by the previous quotation from CS, the pattern of 
latencies and probabilities as a function of the sixteen possible combinations of attack, defense, 
similarity and color, did not differentiate between the three skill levels. The two tables, however, 
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show clear differences in latencies and probabilities depending on whether the pairs of pieces were 
within or between glance. A similar pattern was found with the placements from the memory task, 
now categorized as a function of whether they were placed with an interval of less or more than two 
seconds. This was an essential result for the claim that their method was able to identify chunk 
boundaries. But, again, there was no difference between the three players, suggesting that they used 
the same perceptual building blocks for constructing chunks (more about this later.)
Size of chunk. CS found that chunk size differed in the memory task between the three 
players (2.5, 2.1, and 1.9 pieces, for the master, Class A player, and beginner, respectively) and we 
agree with LF and others (e.g., Holding, 1985) that the master’s chunks were small. CS (p. 76) note 
that “chess skill is reflected in the speed with which chunks are perceived in the perception task and 
the size of the chunks in the memory task.” While finding different sizes in the two tasks would 
have been more convincing, this statement is plausible, given the statistically reliable difference 
found with the between-glance latencies (see above). Thus, LF’s criticism of this aspect of the 
results is unfounded.  
Number of chunks. Finally, LF incorrectly claim that performance between the master and 
the beginner cannot be distinguished with respect to the number of chunks. Although the number of 
chunks was well within the postulated size of short-term memory (7 ± 2 chunks), it differed 
between the three participants (7.7, 5.7 and 5.3 pieces for the master, class A player and beginner, 
respectively), and Chase and Simon considered this result as a serious challenge for their theory. 
The content of chunks warrants further comments. Referring to the within- and between-
chunk probabilities of the different chess relations in the copy and recall task, CS (p. 68) note that 
“these probabilities are informative about the underlying structures that the subjects are perceiving.” 
LF take issue with this conclusion (p. 72): “The probabilities cannot be informative if there are no 
differences between those that have the ‘‘underlying structures’’ (i.e., chunks) and those that lack 
them.” Here, LF refer to chunks as long-term memory structures, as proposed by the theory, not as 
the chunks inferred by CS’s methodology, which might also include purely perceptual chunks, as 
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this must be the case with the beginner. In CS, these data were informative, because they showed 
that the same low-level perceptual features characterize the chunks of players of different levels. As 
noted by CS, “subjects are noticing the pawn structure, clusters of pieces of the same color, and 
attack and defense relations over small spatial distances” (p. 68). Interestingly, relations of attack, in 
particular over long distances, are rare.2 These data are key to reach the conclusion that chunks are 
“perceptual chunks.”
Later Evidence for Chunking
 CS’s experiment generated considerable research, which LF have not mentioned, on the 
links between perception and cognition (for details, see Gobet, de Voogt, & Retschitzki, 2004; 
Gobet & Simon, 1998a, 1998b); this further research was part of the development of CHREST 
(which did not depend solely on CS, as LF imply). Two replications of the CS experiment (Gobet & 
Clarkson, 2004; Gobet & Simon, 1998a), with larger samples than the original study, added support 
to the result that the pattern of relations is different between and within chunks, and to the two-
second boundary for identifying chunks. These replications also showed that the two main 
anomalies mentioned above disappear when the experiment is carried out with a computer display 
rather than with physical board and pieces. That is, the replications show that masters use large 
chunks (up to 15 pieces in Gobet & Clarkson, 2004) and that the number of chunks is similar 
between skill levels in the memory task (less than three chunks – a smaller estimate than that made 
by CS). A likely explanation for these discrepancies is that, with CS methodology, the size of the 
chunks is limited by the number of pieces that the hand can hold, while this is not the case with a 
computer display. 
In two studies (Charness, 1976; Frey & Adesman, 1976), the presence of chunks was tested 
experimentally. Pieces were presented either grouped using CS chunking relations, ordered by 
columns, or dictated in a random order. The chunk presentation obtained the best recall, as predicted 
by the theory. 
One could criticize the fact that much research has been carried out on chess memory, while 
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the essence of chess playing is finding good moves, not memorising boards. However, memorising 
boards is far from lacking ecological validity, as chess masters often discuss other players’ games in 
progress, and typically do so using their memory of the board position. In addition, Chase and 
Simon themselves (1973a) carried out a number of other tasks, such as memory for sequences of 
moves and memory for games – both of which are essential activities for becoming a chess expert. 
Similarly, and starting with De Groot’s (1946) study, chess research has also focused on problem 
solving (for recent examples, see Bilalić, Mcleod, & Gobet , 2008; Jeremic, Vukmirovic, & 
Radojicic, 2010). Finally, the role of chunking and pattern recognition has been established in many 
other domains of expertise, including games, sports, and science (for reviews, see Ericsson et al., 
2006). Indeed, one of the strengths of Chase and Simon’s theory, and other theories based on 
chunking, is to have shown that the same mechanisms not only account for empirical data from 
memory experiments but also explain how experts find meaning in problem situations and reach 
good solutions while being highly selective in their search.
Corrections of Critique of CHREST/CHUMP
LF have misunderstood a few key points about CHREST and CHUMP, which it is important 
to correct here. The first area is the relation of CHREST to semantic knowledge, such as that a 
position has the theme of king-opposition. Classic theories of chunking (of which CHREST is a 
development) have always been strong on the need to include meaning, analogy and abstract 
concepts (see, for example, De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Didierjean et al., 1999; Freyhoff, Gruber, & 
Ziegler, 1992; Gobet et al., 2001). The template theory, which CHREST implements, directly 
addresses the issue of how high-level knowledge can be accessed when confronted with a specific 
chess position (Gobet & Simon, 1996b); templates account for the generality of themes in both a 
specific and an abstract sense. This area has been developed with CHREST, but not so much with 
chess (see Gobet & Lane, 2005; Lane, Sykes, & Gobet, 2003). 
The second area regards CHUMP, and the ability of CHREST to be a model of problem-
solving. LF present an extended analysis on the unlikely ability of CHUMP – a simple program that 
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chooses moves using pattern recognition only – to locate a good move in a complex situation. LF 
have both promoted CHUMP to the level of a coherent model of expert chess playing, and also 
misunderstood its basic operation. CHUMP is not the model of move selection which the current 
authors envisage as the natural association with CHREST; the appropriate model is SEARCH 
(Gobet, 1997). SEARCH is a probabilistic and abstract model that iteratively looks ahead from the 
current position using pattern recognition to retrieve chunks that are used to generate a move. 
SEARCH will consider several such episodes of analysis, as time and resources permit.  
To correct a specific concern of LF: CHREST does not need to acquire a unique chunk or 
template for every position – instead, a set of chunks or templates will be retrieved for any position 
and a candidate move selected from a range of sources.
Conclusion: Evolution or Revolution?
Although you can expect the present authors to have a bias towards their own theory, we feel 
there is enough existing evidence to support the continuing evolution of CHREST towards a more 
complete theory of human perception and problem solving.  At the least, we do not believe LF have 
presented enough evidence to reject the conclusions of CS or the development of chunking theory 
and related models of expertise.  In addition, it is unlikely that one single mechanism – analogy –
explains an activity as complex as chess skill, and more likely that a number of mechanisms, such 
as those implemented in CHREST and SEARCH (including implicit learning, pattern recognition, 
visual search, and look-ahead search) are at play. We suggest that the fundamental result of de 
Groot, that expertise is driven by memory of items in a domain, will remain a cornerstone of 
expertise research.  The challenge, currently taken up by CHREST, is to see how this memory can 
be acquired and built up into the more abstract patterns of thinking and comparison referred to 
above.  We believe the only way to meet that challenge is through evolving our current 
understanding of human memory into a more powerful theory, not by discarding what has gone 
before in a drastic revolution. 
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Footnotes
1 LF’s description of CS experiment is not particularly clear. For example, the reader might have 
been confused by the five labels used for the three players used by CS: master, Class A player, Class 
B player, Class C player, and beginner. In particular, the beginner is sometimes called beginner, 
sometimes Class B player, and sometimes Class C player. The real skill levels were master, Class A 
player, and beginner. Incidentally, some of the passages from CS are not correctly quoted by LF, as 
CS used the labels “A” (for class A player) and “B” (for beginner) rather than “class A” or “class 
B.”
2 It might be worth mentioning that, in a task consisting of memorising sequences of moves, 
relations of defence and attack are used much more often than in the memory for static positions 
(Chase & Simon, 1973a).
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Figures
 
Figure 1. Example of the importance of absolute location in chess. Position (a), taken from Linhares 
and Freitas (2010), is a win for White, but White cannot win in the shifted positions (b) and (c) (see 
text). Readers who do not play chess might consider the following example: in basketball, a 
configuration of two players of team A attacking a player of team B holding the ball has a different 
meaning depending whether these players are under the basket of team A or in the centre of the 
field.
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Figure 2. Another example of the importance of absolute location in chess. Position (a), taken from 
Linhares and Freitas (2010), is a win for White (assuming White plays first), but Black is winning 
in the shifted position (b). See text for detail.
